INVIGORATING IBSA; INVENTING IIBSAA

INVIGORATING IBSA; INVENTING IIBSAA

DR. ADITYANJEE

http://councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/2013/05/invigorating-ibsa-inventing-iibsaa.html

Introduction:

The post-mortem reports of the recently held 5th BRICS summit from March 26th-27th 2013 have already been written and forgotten. On June 6th 2013, India is hosting the next IBSA summit. As early as 2011, this analyst had predicted that China will try to kill IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) grouping by enlarging the BRIC to BRICS [1]. China cunningly brought in South Africa in the original BRIC grouping in 2011 though it did not belong to this economic dialogue forum. China had two-fold objectives: First and foremost to neutralize IBSA and second fold to gain entry into the African continent using South Africa as a staging post [2]. The original criteria for BRIC membership was the status of the four countries as emerging economies. Though these countries are very disparate and have their own separate agenda, the common anti-Western stance and emerging economy status were the two least common denominators [3]. China has indeed used the modified BRICS mechanism to make IBSA redundant and has become the de facto leader of BRICS [4]. BRICS has been described as an artificial grouping. Rajinder Puri, a senior columnist has stated very bluntly: “Neither strategic nor economic considerations justify the new grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China. All four nations have vastly different priorities and concerns” [5]. Predictably South Africa led by President Zacob Zuma repaid the favor done by China while serving as a useful idiot for the Beijing and created dissonance in the BRICS with India feeling humiliated as the Indian PM was kept 40 kilometers away from the venue [6]. As Jaswant Singh rightly points out that Lamido Sanusi, the governor of Nigeria’s central bank, has called for Africans to recognize that“their romance with China” has helped to bring about “a new form of imperialism” [7]. Both Brazil and India are very wary of China’s mercantilist trade policies [8]. A cash-rich China is going to use its $ 3.4 trillion foreign exchange reserves to dominate the BRICS Development Bank and the BRICS Currency Reserve Arrangement (CRA).
In the Bandung Conference in 1955, both India and China sought to take the leadership of the developing countries. As the NAM or the group of 77 gradually evolved, China was relegated to the background owing to its own internal problems whereas India emerged as the clear leader of the NAM and the developing world leaving behind both Egypt and Indonesia. China had resented the towering personality and the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru in the NAM. Now NAM is practically defunct and has lost its relevance though ritualistic and meaningless meetings still go on. In a sense BRICS had the potential to assume the collective leadership of the “Global South” in the 21stcentury when NAM had run out of steam.
The biggest USP of the IBSA summit is that IBSA is an outfit that is sought by the Chinese to be rendered infructuous after BRICS [9]. Incidentally, just like NAM, IBSA was facilitated into existence by another Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who met with his counter-parts in 2003 in Evian. The establishment of IBSA was announced on June 6th, 2003 by signing of “Brasilia Declaration” by the external affairs ministers of India, Brazil and South Africa. This “Brasilia declaration” mentions the democratic credentials of the three member nations, their status as developing countries, and their capacity of acting on a global scale as the main reasons for coming together as a grouping.
The Chinese checkmate to India in BRICS must be dealt with coolly with a focus on invigorating the IBSA mechanism .India must do the necessary ground work and home work so that the “enhanced” BRICS does not end up swallowing and eventually digesting the “IBSA” where India has been the prime mover [10]. We will discuss some of the historical antecedents and tactical responses that India can adopt to counter China while maintaining the leadership of the “Global South” in the international arena.

BRICS Versus IBSA

A detailed exposition on the differential roles and the relationship between IBSA and BRICS is dealt by Professor Arkhangelskyaya from the Russian Academy of Sciences; there are some areas of overlap between BRICS and IBSA especially in the constituent membership [11]. However, that alone does not justify disbanding of the IBSA because the defining characteristic of IBSA is south-south cooperation among the “developing democracies”. Some have erroneously suggested that the IBSA was the past having been started in 2004 and BRICS is the future [12]. The role of BRICS is very different from that of IBSA. It is essentially a counterweight to G7 in the global power politics. BRICS has been seen by many analysts as a step towards the evolution of a multipolar world order. This is true to an extent but BRICS has yet to prove its credentials [13]. Whether it will succeed in its role of counter-balancing the G7 will be very much a function of future Chinese international behavior. If China tries to dominate the group, except for South Africa, none of the other countries will tolerate Chinese quest for paramount leadership role under the BRICS framework. It is very unlikely that Russian Federation will serve as a junior partner of China for long. As the former external affairs minister Jaswant Singh emphasizes very succinctly: “BRICS’ shared potential does not translate into collaborative action. On the contrary, each of the BRICS will have to pursue its goals, and confront its challenges, individually [14].
Both Egypt and Indonesia are very keen to join the BRICS. Other potential applicants may include Turkey, Nigeria and Mexico. Future membership of the BRICS should be criteria based and not driven by Chinese or Russian strategic interests in order to avoid intra-group squabbles. Here one would agree with the Russian suggestion for freezing the BRICS membership for the next few years. Despite having overlapping memberships, the two can act as complimentary to each other. One major difference between the two fora is the two tiered power structure of BRICS in which two of its members are also permanent, veto wielding members of the UNSC [15]. As permanent members of the UNSC, neither Russia nor China is enthusiastic about the entry of Brazil, India or South Africa into the inner sanctorum [16]. These two, Russia and China are also members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a quasi-security pact in Central Asia [17]. There are apprehensions that the SCO agenda of Russia and China may contaminate the functioning of BRICS. India’s participation in BRICS is being questioned as costly [18]. The relevance of South Africa’s membership is also debatable on economic grounds [19]. Such a differential economic power equation is not conducive to long-term harmonious functioning of BRICS. Harsh Pant hits the bull’s eye when he says: “The narrative surrounding the rise of BRICS is as exaggerated as that of decline for the US. The tectonic plates of global politics are certainly shifting, but their movements are unpredictable. BRICS will remain an artificial construct, merely an acronym coined by an investment banking analyst, for some time to come” [20].

Future of IBSA

Keeping in view the inadequacies of BRICS, India must remain determined to continue with IBSA as well. Over the years, IBSA has become an umbrella for various initiatives in the diplomatic and policy field, in Public Administration and inclusive developmental sectors. It is important to note that IBSA members do not have any geo-political or territorial conflicts but that is not true of BRICS. Both India and China do have a border conflict which has not been resolved. Similarly, both China and Russia share an extensive land border and do have some territorial and geo-political issues. There is latent competition between Russia and China for dominance in Central Asia although both would like to see the US dominance in global affairs reduced. The degree to which a shadow of BRICS will fall on IBSA seems to be very dependent on the weakest link, South Africa, which is “sitting on two chairs” [21]. The signature issue for the IBSA identified in the “Brasilia Declaration” was south-south cooperation for the “developing democracies”. Despite what happened in Durban, South Africa, the IBSA remains a good forum for the “developing democracies”. A resurgent India must learn to be proactive and not reactive in execution of her foreign policy.

Inventing IBSAA

India must take the leader-ship to enlarge the “IBSA” into “IIBSAA” (India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa & Argentina) in order to make this block of developing democracies more relevant in the international fora. This would require two other “developing democracies”, namely Indonesia and Argentina to be invited to join the “IBSA”. Both China and Russia are not true democracies at this time and do not deserve a seat on the enlarged “IIBSAA” forum. The China angle would be important in the enlarged IIBSAA by virtue of its absence! Though Egypt is interested in joining BRICS and may be interested in joining IIBSAA also, it is not a fully evolved democracy as yet. More democratic reforms would be needed before Egypt can qualify for the status of “developing democracy”. After inviting Indonesia and Argentina, the membership should be frozen for the next five years while criteria for membership are agreed upon and the organization evolves in a credible manner. India should finalize a formal charter for the enlarged IIBSAA and minimum criteria for future membership applications.

Building a Permanent Secretariat

Without a permanent executive secretariat, any international organization is likely to wither away as we have learnt from the NAM experience. India must offer her facilities to host a permanent executive secretariat for the enlarged IIBSAA forum in New Delhi. Perhaps, the MEA sponsored think tank like ICWA can serve as the temporary facility while new office space is located and infra-structure is built. Besides rotating presidency for two years there must a permanent executive secretary general appointed for a period of not less five years to provide continuity in policy otherwise the agenda seems to change with every rotating presidency. No person should be allowed more than two terms as secretary general of the IIBSAA. IIBSAA members should coordinate their voting patterns in the UN General Assembly and the UNSC whenever possible. It should be the responsibility of the Secretary General to coordinate the various viewpoints and arrive at a consensus of the “developing democracies”.

IIBSAA Fund

The original IBSA mechanism had a puny corpus of three million dollars per year contributed equally by each of the three countries. The fund is managed by the UNDP and focuses on projects on poverty alleviation. This needs to be increased sequentially so that lack of funds to do not handicap this important forum. Perhaps, the newly enlarged group should aim for a corpus of $ one billion per year with each country contributing $ 200 million. This Fund for poverty alleviation and inclusive growth should not be considered as a challenge or alternative to the BRICS Development Bank which will be used only for infra-structure needs.

IIBSAA FTASA

At a time when free trade areas are becoming the norm, the developing democracies should negotiate a “free trade and services area” among the member nations. Both the CII (Confederation of India Industries) and the FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) should be encouraged to establish an IIBSAA Business Council.

IIBSAA Maritime Dialogue

Since all these five nations are sea-fairing nations with long coast lines, naval and maritime cooperation should be beefed up. Joint anti-piracy efforts in a coordinated manner in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea while securing sea lanes of commerce should be a priority. Providing naval refueling and docking facilities to merchant ships and naval assets of member nations needs to be formalized by agreement.

IIBSAA Counter-Terrorism Efforts

An enhanced IIBSAA should focus on intelligence gathering across various continents to deal with the scourge of terrorism. As terror organizations have global reach and utilize lax laws in developing countries, perhaps common strategies for counter-terrorism efforts would be a new area for cooperation among the IIBSAA countries.

Human Rights Focus

Since all the three current members are multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-ethnic democracies focusing on inclusive growth and poverty alleviation, the group needs to take consistent viewpoint on human rights internationally [22]. On the issue of human rights other members of the BRICS mainly China and Russia have to improve their records before they can become candidates for this group. The group has to deal with Western Countries so that the R2P doctrine is not misused internationally against developing democracies while furthering the Western agenda [23]. This group can provide advice and material help to other developing democracies in improving their human rights records and performances on their own without being scrutinized by the West, thereby avoiding intrusive external interventions.

Delivering Democratic Dividend

The fruits of inclusive growth must be delivered to the masses within the boundaries of each of the member nation in a fair and equitable manner. That is the democracy dividend that members of the enlarged IIBSAA must try to gift their citizens and to citizens of the rest of the world. This aim alone would make for the very existence and the raison d’etre of this important dialogue forum.

DR. ADITYANJEE

PRESIDENT,

THE COUNCIL FOR STRATEGIC AFFAIRS,  NEW DELHI 
 adityancsa@gmail.com

twitter@adityanjee

1. 1. Adityanjee: Invading the strategic space: the Dragon fires another salvo at India,
2. Ibid
3. Adityanjee: Securitisation of the BRICS
4. Ibid
5. Rajinder Puri : Building China Brick by BRIC!
6.  Indian Express  
7.  Jaswant Singh: Crumbling BRICS,
8.  Shyam Saran: BRICS and premature orbituaries,
9.  Rajeev Sharma: Natural partners: Why India needs to get closer to Japan,
10.  Op cit Adityanjee, #3
11. Arkhangelskaya, Alexandra A: IBSA-past? BRICS-Future?
12.  Ibid
13.  Arvind Gupta: BRICS comes of age at Durban
14.  Op cit Jaswant Singh (#7)
15.  Op cit Adityanjee (#3)
16.  Op cit Shyam sharan (#8)
17.  Adityanjee (#3)
18.  Rajiv Kumar; BRICS: India’s costly time-pass.
19.  Roy Robins: One of the BRICS is not like the others.
20.  Harsh Pant: BRICS Nothing But a Chinese Front Group.
21.  Op cit Arkhangelskaya, Alexandra A (#11)
22.  G Ananthapadmanabhan and Atila Roque: India and Brazil: Time for a New Human Rights Partnership.
23.  ibid

No First Use Nuclear Doctrine with “Chinese Characteristics”

Dr. Adityanjee

http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/may/02/no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-with-chinese-characteristics

http://www.councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/2013/05/no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-with.html

Introduction
Like a chameleon, the dragon, very predictably is changing its colors with regards to its often stated nuclear doctrine of “no first use” (NFU). Since 1964 when China conducted its first nuclear weapon test, China has repeatedly and vociferously insisted that it would not be the first nuclear power to use a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon in pursuit of its strategic objectives. This NFU pledge was explicitly and unconditionally included in each of China’s defense white papers from the first in 1998 through the seventh one in 2011. Recently, there is some international debate about possible changes in China’s NFU doctrine following publication of China’s biannual 2013 Defense White Paper. However, it appears that China may have moved beyond its so-called NFU doctrine and its duplicitous pledges do not hold any sincere meaning. Strategic deception has been an important part of China’s military DNA since the times of Sun Tzu who wrote in his treatise the Art of War: “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away. Since achieving a great economic success and flush with $ 3.4 trillion foreign exchange reserves, China has increased its list of core national issues and has adopted a more belligerent strategic posture and hegemonic attitude towards international community in general and its neighbors in particular. Disregarding the Deng’s advice of lying low and bidding your time, the current (5^th) generation of China’s leaders are adopting aggressive postures militarily though the transformation into visibly hardened strategic claims started really during the reign of the 4th generation leaders (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo).

The last time a Chinese paramount leader reaffirmed the so-called NFU pledge was on March 27^th 2012 in Seoul Nuclear Conference when Hu Jintao mentioned it in his address. However, in December 2012, the new 5th generation Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping failed to mention about the so-called no first use pledge in a speech given to Second Artillery Force of the PLA which manages China’s land-based nuclear weapons. Apparently, he also stated that nuclear weapons create strategic support for China’s status as a major world power. This is a significant departure from the previously stated public positions citing Mao Zedong’s ideas about the use of nuclear weapons as a taboo and labeling the nuclear weapons essentially as “paper tigers”.

Fundamentals of NFU Commitment
Out of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons currently, only two, China and India had explicitly stated “No First Use” as the guiding principle of their strategic nuclear doctrine.
An absolute and unconditional NFU commitment would have four following components:

1. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
2. Not to threaten use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
3. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons
4. Not to threaten to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons

NFU policy has been a core feature of the Chinese defense policy having been decided apparently by Chairman Mao himself in 1964. Critics of the Chinese NFU commitment claim that it is completely unverifiable and is mere rhetoric. Self-described “China hawks” in the West have derisively dismissed the Chinese NFU pledge as pure propaganda for the last five decades. Chinese strategists have debated the merits of dropping or altering the NFU policy. This debate was reportedly very intense from mid to late 2000s. There are assertions from Chinese officials that Chinese NFU commitment is not applicable to perceived claims on territories. China has territorial disputes with multiple neighbors including India. Presumably since China continues to claim that Arunachal Pradesh is its own territory, in a hypothetical scenario, it may use tactical nuclear weapons in a war with India in eastern sector because China will consider this use not against any other country but in its own perceived territory. Similarly, China will not be bound by its NFU if the US were to intervene in Taiwan in case of a Sino-Taiwanese war as it considers Taiwan as a renegade province. Chinese NFU is not applicable if it apprehends annihilation of its top leadership by conventional means. Similarly, a conventional attack on strategic target like the Three Gorges Dam would be an exception to the NFU pledge. More recently, Chinese have discussed other possible exceptions from their NFU commitment including a massive precision guided conventional attack on their intercontinental ballistic missile silos or their strategic facilities. As China moves away from minimal credible deterrence to “limited deterrence”, a more sophisticated delivery mechanism and an exponential increase in its nuclear stockpile, it has also moved towards greater flexibility and continued opacity in its nuclear operational doctrine. It is pertinent to say that the so-called Chinese NFU commitment has never been taken seriously by both the US and Russia at any time in their policy matrix.

Chinese Nuclear Arsenal
China can be considered the largest nuclear power after the US and Russia. China’s nuclear capability is apparently stronger than those of the next six nuclear states combined. According to Russian estimates, since early 1960s China has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons grade uranium and 10 tons of plutonium which would be enough to produce 3,600 nuclear war-heads. It is probable that half of this fissile material is kept in stocks whereas the rest half has been used up to produce 1500-1800 warheads, half of which may be in storage. This would leave 800-900 warheads that could be available for operational deployment on various types of delivery vehicles. Therefore, the real motives for China’s complete secrecy about its nuclear forces lie not in their “weakness” and “small size” but in much larger strength of China’s actual nuclear arsenal that is much higher than the commonly cited number of 300-400 warheads by the western analysts. There is also a great degree of international uncertainty about the hundreds of tunnels being built in China as their purpose has not yet been officially explained.

Chinese Nuclear Posture and Track II Interactions
Personal interactions with various Chinese academicians and officials during policy conferences suggest that China will continue to add to its nuclear arsenal and will not participate in any nuclear disarmament program till it reaches a certain level. This analyst has interacted with Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies from Fudan University, Shanghai over the last four years with very consistent and candid answers regarding Chinese national nuclear posture. Professor Shen Dingli claims to have independent (but sometimes more hawkish views) from those of the Chinese Government. In 2009 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, DC, he expressed absolute ignorance about Chinese proliferation activities and the fact that Chinese weapons designs were turned in by Libya to the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) when Libya folded up their clandestine nuclear program. He was totally unaware of China’s both vertical and horizontal proliferation activities as late as April 2009. During the 2009 Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, he agreed that Chinese government will continue to increase its number of nuclear war-heads. In a more recent Carnegie Endowment meeting on India-China dialogue in Washington DC on January 10th 2013, he again reiterated that China will continue to modernize its nuclear arsenals and the delivery systems till a perceived parity is achieved with the two great powers (US and Russia). China will certainly not agree to cut the number of nuclear arsenals as it wants both the US and Russia to implement further reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

Interactions with another Chinese academician Dr. Shulong Chu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the School of Public Policy and Management and the Deputy Director of the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China in a session on China-US Strategic Stability on 4/6/2009 during the Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington DC revealed very interesting Chinese perspectives. Chu explicitly stated that since China has accepted US supremacy, analogously both India and Japan should accept Chinese supremacy in the Asia-pacific region. China is a bigger country than Japan and India. It has bigger military requirements. Japan, India and other Asian countries should understand that and should be willing to accept China’s ongoing modernization of its military and strategic (read nuclear) assets. Chu further went on saying: “Russia and the US have too many nuclear war-heads. They can afford to have deep cuts. China cannot do that because China has too few. China wants more and its agenda is to have more nuclear weapons”.

Major-General Yao Yunzhu, Director of the Center on China-America Defense Relations of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing in a session on Deterrence, Disarmament and Non-proliferation during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013, artfully deflected all the questions on China’s growing number of nuclear arsenals with a cute smile, stating again that the onus for nuclear warhead reduction lies on both US and Russia because China has very limited, small number of nuclear weapons. General Yao while doing routine lip-service to the NFU doctrine explicitly admitted that, "A certain amount of opaqueness is an integral part of China's no-first-use policy". She persistently refused to quantify the number of warheads China needed for a credible and effective nuclear deterrence. She officially expressed Chinese Government‘s serious concern at the US shifting its ballistic missiles interceptors in the Pacific island of Guam to deal with DPRK nuclear threat, thereby degrading the quality of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. She enumerated three essential characteristics for the Chinese nuclear deterrent: it has to be survivable against first strike; it has to be credible enough in numbers and in delivery system, and lastly it has to have an effective and punitive second strike retaliatory capability. She was asked about recent BMD tests by China on January 22nd 2013 and she categorically confirmed that China will, from now on, indeed develop its own BMD system as the US is not willing to commit to cease its BMD system.

Professor Li Bin from the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing and also a Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC admits formally in his writings that China’s non-proliferation posture has evolved over a period of time and now is an important and essential part of its nuclear theology. However, in private discussions he passionately justified Chinese horizontal proliferation activities outside the scope of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by providing Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 nuclear plants to Pakistan on grounds that China had helped India also with nuclear fuel supplies for the Tarapore Atomic Reactor when India was under the US nuclear embargo. He assertively implied that China will continue to provide nuclear materials and technology to its all-weather friend Pakistan analogous to US-India civil nuclear deal though the latter deal was approved by the NSG. Interestingly a younger researcher Zhu Jianyu from the Center for Strategic Studies of the China Academy of Engineering Physics during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013 candidly admitted that Chinese press and academicians usually toe the government line because the government controls their funding and hence independent viewpoints are not possible.

In private discussions with Major General Yao, it became quite clear that China will now vigorously pursue development of its national ballistic missile defense system; something which China had vociferously denounced earlier. She also stated that China will continue to develop its ASAT weapons till a legally binding multi-lateral treaty banning weaponization of the space is signed and ratified. Major General Yao attributed to and categorically linked this shift in Chinese strategic thinking to the recent US decision to deploy 14 long-range ballistic missile interceptor batteries in the Pacific Island of Guam ostensibly in response to threats posed by the DPRK thereby potentially degrading the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Changes in the Chinese nuclear posture are also linked to the US development and deployment of advanced precision guided conventional warheads in the Asian theatre capable of destroying Chinese multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) ballistic missile silos thereby degrading the Chinese minimum nuclear deterrent. China is focused on modernizing and its strategic survivability and beefing up its effective second strike capability and therefore will continue to develop more nuclear warheads and will keep its nuclear capabilities fully opaque.

China’s 2013 Defence White Paper
For the first time, the 2013 edition of China’s defense white paper entitled: “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” conspicuously fails to mention re-adherence to and re-affirmation of China’s often-stated “No first use pledge”. This is significant departure from the 2011 version of China’s Defense White Paper. The absolutely deafening silence in the 2013 version on NFU is deliberate and is very significant for its reverberating eloquence. The new white paper introduces ambiguity as it endorses the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack but does not rule out other uses. In the last few years, Chinese analysts and officials have done an excellent job of qualifying the original Chinese “NFU” pledge with myriads of qualitative exceptions so as to render it effectively meaningless. This carefully contrived departure is strategically significant for the international community.

Following a vigorous international debate on China’s departure from the NFU policy, Major General Yao floated a trial balloon in an op-ed piece in Asia Times Online on April 24^th 2013 when she called for a legally binding multi-lateral NFU agreement. She wrote a point by point rejoinder while still defending the reasons as to why China should depart from the often stated NFU policy and acknowledged that domestic discussions happening in China regarding junking the NFU policy. She has tried to invoke new exceptions to China’s so-called NFU commitment linking it to a new US law (2013 National Defense Authorization Act) that seeks a report from the Commander of the US Strategic Command by August 15^th 2013 to describe the Chinese underground tunnel networks and to review the US capability to neutralize such networks with conventional and nuclear forces.

Ostensibly, with a view to creating more confusion and more opaqueness about China’s intentions, she explicitly states: “To alleviate China's concerns, a constructive approach would be to assure the policy through nuclear policy dialogues, to establish a multilateral NFU agreement among all the nuclear weapon states, and to consider limiting or even prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding international agreement.” Li Bin, in bilateral context, has previously suggested that India and China should begin their nuclear engagement with mutual reassurance of NFU and should work together in advocating NFU in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.
China very well knows such a legally binding international agreement will not be negotiated for several decades owing to US dogmatic postures. The US is already spending $10 billion to upgrade its nuclear weapons despite Obama’s initial call for a global zero goal. This gives a window of opportunity for China to increase its nuclear warheads exponentially while keeping its so-called NFU pledge under suspended animation and even junk it de facto. Interestingly, China refuses to enter into an official government to government nuclear weapons dialogue with India on the grounds that India is non-signatory to the NPT. At the same time, China has shrewdly refused to engage in bilateral dialogue with the US on nuclear arms reductions on grounds of asymmetry of nuclear forces of respective countries. China does complain of discrimination and nuclear asymmetry while discussing US-China relations but fails to address genuine Indian concerns on similar grounds.

Implications for India
Western debate on the perceptible change in Chinese nuclear posture has focussed only on its narrow impact on the strategic environment of the US and its allies including Japan. India should not behave like an ostrich burying its head in the sand. Perhaps, time has come for India to review her own strategic nuclear doctrine revising the no-first use pledge. Robust evidence has come cumulatively over a period of time from multiple sources reflecting the new nuclear reality in our neighborhood. Totality of the evidence available convinces this analyst that China has indeed changed its nuclear posture from defensive to offensive and is on a large-scale nuclear build-up. China is indeed willing to consider first strike capability to preserve its core national issues though vehemently denying such intentions at the moment. Predictably, China will continue to obfuscate this change in nuclear posture using ambiguous, turgid and opaque language while simultaneously blaming the US for failing to negotiate a legally binding multi-lateral agreement on NFU. Indeed, this gives the dragon a fig-leaf of deniability. Certainly, India should not countenance being the only nuclear weapon state pledging “no first use” while the global nuclear posturing has become indeed hardened. One has to take into factor Pakistan’s accelerated development of tactical nuclear weapons and its stringent refusal to negotiate and sign a multi-lateral Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and continued Chinese help to Pakistan in and outside the NSG. While Pakistan has never subscribed to an NFU commitment and its nuclear arsenal is specifically India-centric; the recent change in China’s nuclear posture is definitely of concern to India. The writing is on the wall as China does not have good track record of strategic comfort and reliability vis-a-vis India. The current incidence of Chinese incursion into Indian territory in Daulat Beg Oldie region in the Ladakh sector should be an eye-opener. While India must focus on its economic, infrastructure and social development and must not waste her meager fiscal resources in a costly nuclear race, she needs to be prepared for all strategic options. Given the aggressive behavior of China in recent years appropriate and credible policies need to be adopted including having a re-look at evolving nuclear posture of China.


http://www.councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/2013/05/no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-with.html

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Published Date: 2^nd May 2013

• National Security and Strategic Studies
• China
• Def

SHOULD THE MANDARIN SPEAKING NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RESIGN?

SHOULD THE MANDARIN SPEAKING NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RESIGN? 

DR.ADITYANJEE

http://councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/2013/05/should-mandarin-speaking-national.html

There was a Pakistani intrusion into Indian territory in 1999 in Kargil in J&K. It was considered as an intelligence failure of Himalayan proportions. Post-Kargil, an expert committee was appointed by the then Prime Minister  Atal Bihari Vajpayee under the chairmanship of Late Shri K. Subramaniam, former Defense Secretary and a respected strategy and security expert  that made a number of recommendations.  One of the suggestions was to establish the office of the National Security Advisor who would render overall advice to the Government of India (read PMO) on security matters so as to avoid the kind of intelligence failure we saw  during the Kargil fiasco.

India’s current National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon is a Mandarin speaking former foreign secretary who has held the office of NSA since 17th January 2010. He has been a former Indian Ambassador to China who has generally a good image as a diplomat having succeeded in getting NSG approval for the US-India Civil Nuclear Energy Deal. He comes from a family of accomplished diplomats; his father Parappil Narayana Menon served as the ambassador to Yugoslavia in his last days. His grandfather K. P. S. Menon (senior) was India's first Foreign Secretary, while his uncle K. P. S. Menon (junior) was the former Indian ambassador to China. From these impeccable credentials it appears that diplomacy runs in his genes. It also seems that being the foreign secretary to the Government of India as well as being the ambassador to China runs in his genes from the paternal side of his family. He has generally taken a very conciliatory stance towards China in his public pronouncements.

We are facing again a situation analogous to both 1999 Kargil fiasco as well as 1962 Chinese war against India in regards to the recent Chinese intrusion in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector in the Ladakh district of  J&K. There were ample warnings about multiple Chinese intrusions into Indian territory across the Line of Actual Control during the last few years. All branches of the PLA (army, air-force and navy) have repeatedly intruded into Indian territory during the last few years. In fact the former Chief of Army retired General VK Singh had amply warned the Government of India about lack of military preparedness on our northern border against a very hostile adversary. Our security establishment as well as the government of the day minimized these brazen incidents. False and dastardly malicious rumors were spread about the possibility of an army coup being staged by the retired General VK Singh.

Certainly, it appears that the current NSA has failed miserably in properly advising the Government of India about the magnitude of the threat perception from China though he has been in office for more than three years. There has been a serious failure of overall threat assessment as well as of threat perception from China by the office of NSA. It would be honorable for the NSA Shiv Shankar Menon to submit his resignation and own up the moral responsibility for the dismal failure of his office. One wonders whether he was reading the Chinese (Mandarin) press at all during the last three years?

This brings us to two more pertinent issues regarding management of India’s security establishment. 

First has to do with the credentials for appointment to the post of National Security Advisor. Why it is that only retired IFS officers are deemed worthy and capable enough of leading the office of the NSA? Why does not the Government of the day rely on security and strategic expertise outside the “clubby” community of retired civil servants. Why can we not have a retired defense officer appointed as the National Security Advisor?

Second relevant issue is about the non-implementation of the K Subramaniam Committee’s recommendation about the appointment of a Chief of Defense Staff (CDS). When will the Government of India consider appointing a CDS? Perhaps after the PLA reaches New Delhi? 

George Santayana once famously said: “Those who fail to learn from the lessons of history are condemned to repeat it!

DR. ADITYANJEE

PRESIDENT,

THE COUNCIL FOR STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI

adityancsa@gmail.com