http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/may/02/no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-with-chinese-characteristics
http://www.councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/2013/05/no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-with.html
Introduction
Like a chameleon, the dragon, very predictably is changing its colors
with regards to its often stated nuclear doctrine of “no first use”
(NFU). Since 1964 when China conducted its first nuclear weapon test,
China has repeatedly and vociferously insisted that it would not be the
first nuclear power to use a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon in
pursuit of its strategic objectives. This NFU pledge was explicitly and
unconditionally included in each of China’s defense white papers from
the first in 1998 through the seventh one in 2011. Recently, there is
some international debate about possible changes in China’s NFU doctrine
following publication of China’s biannual 2013 Defense White Paper.
However, it appears that China may have moved beyond its so-called NFU
doctrine and its duplicitous pledges do not hold any sincere meaning.
Strategic deception has been an important part of China’s military DNA
since the times of Sun Tzu who wrote in his treatise the
Art of War:
“All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack,
we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when
we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away. Since
achieving a great economic success and flush with $ 3.4 trillion foreign
exchange reserves, China has increased its list of core national issues
and has adopted a more belligerent strategic posture and hegemonic
attitude towards international community in general and its neighbors
in particular. Disregarding the Deng’s advice of lying low and bidding
your time, the current (5
th) generation of China’s leaders
are adopting aggressive postures militarily though the transformation
into visibly hardened strategic claims started really during the reign
of the 4th generation leaders (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo).
The last time a Chinese paramount leader reaffirmed the so-called NFU pledge was on March 27
th
2012 in Seoul Nuclear Conference when Hu Jintao mentioned it in his
address. However, in December 2012, the new 5th generation Chinese
paramount leader Xi Jinping failed to mention about the so-called no
first use pledge in a speech given to Second Artillery Force of the PLA
which manages China’s land-based nuclear weapons. Apparently, he also
stated that nuclear weapons create strategic support for China’s status
as a major world power. This is a significant departure from the
previously stated public positions citing Mao Zedong’s ideas about the
use of nuclear weapons as a taboo and labeling the nuclear weapons
essentially as “paper tigers”.
Fundamentals of NFU Commitment
Out of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons currently,
only two, China and India had explicitly stated “No First Use” as the
guiding principle of their strategic nuclear doctrine.
An absolute and unconditional NFU commitment would have four following components:
- Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
- Not to threaten use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
- Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons
- Not to threaten to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons
NFU policy has been a core feature of the Chinese defense policy
having been decided apparently by Chairman Mao himself in 1964. Critics
of the Chinese NFU commitment claim that it is completely unverifiable
and is mere rhetoric. Self-described “China hawks” in the West have
derisively dismissed the Chinese NFU pledge as pure propaganda for the
last five decades. Chinese strategists have debated the merits of
dropping or altering the NFU policy. This debate was reportedly very
intense from mid to late 2000s. There are assertions from Chinese
officials that Chinese NFU commitment is not applicable to perceived
claims on territories. China has territorial disputes with multiple
neighbors including India. Presumably since China continues to claim
that Arunachal Pradesh is its own territory, in a hypothetical scenario,
it may use tactical nuclear weapons in a war with India in eastern
sector because China will consider this use not against any other
country but in its own perceived territory. Similarly, China will not be
bound by its NFU if the US were to intervene in Taiwan in case of a
Sino-Taiwanese war as it considers Taiwan as a renegade province.
Chinese NFU is not applicable if it apprehends annihilation of its top
leadership by conventional means. Similarly, a conventional attack on
strategic target like the Three Gorges Dam would be an exception to the
NFU pledge. More recently, Chinese have discussed other possible
exceptions from their NFU commitment including a massive precision
guided conventional attack on their intercontinental ballistic missile
silos or their strategic facilities. As China moves away from minimal
credible deterrence to “limited deterrence”, a more sophisticated
delivery mechanism and an exponential increase in its nuclear stockpile,
it has also moved towards greater flexibility and continued opacity in
its nuclear operational doctrine. It is pertinent to say that the
so-called Chinese NFU commitment has never been taken seriously by both
the US and Russia at any time in their policy matrix.
Chinese Nuclear Arsenal
China can be considered the largest nuclear power after the US and
Russia. China’s nuclear capability is apparently stronger than those of
the next six nuclear states combined. According to Russian estimates,
since early 1960s China has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons grade
uranium and 10 tons of plutonium which would be enough to produce 3,600
nuclear war-heads. It is probable that half of this fissile material is
kept in stocks whereas the rest half has been used up to produce
1500-1800 warheads, half of which may be in storage. This would leave
800-900 warheads that could be available for operational deployment on
various types of delivery vehicles. Therefore, the real motives for
China’s complete secrecy about its nuclear forces lie not in their
“weakness” and “small size” but in much larger strength of China’s
actual nuclear arsenal that is much higher than the commonly cited
number of 300-400 warheads by the western analysts. There is also a
great degree of international uncertainty about the hundreds of tunnels
being built in China as their purpose has not yet been officially
explained.
Chinese Nuclear Posture and Track II Interactions
Personal interactions with various Chinese academicians and officials
during policy conferences suggest that China will continue to add to
its nuclear arsenal and will not participate in any nuclear disarmament
program till it reaches a certain level. This analyst has interacted
with Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean of the Institute of
International Studies from Fudan University, Shanghai over the last four
years with very consistent and candid answers regarding Chinese
national nuclear posture. Professor Shen Dingli claims to have
independent (but sometimes more hawkish views) from those of the Chinese
Government. In 2009 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington,
DC, he expressed absolute ignorance about Chinese proliferation
activities and the fact that Chinese weapons designs were turned in by
Libya to the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) when Libya folded
up their clandestine nuclear program. He was totally unaware of China’s
both vertical and horizontal proliferation activities as late as April
2009. During the 2009 Carnegie International Non-proliferation
Conference, Washington, DC, he agreed that Chinese government will
continue to increase its number of nuclear war-heads. In a more recent
Carnegie Endowment meeting on India-China dialogue in Washington DC on
January 10th 2013, he again reiterated that China will continue to
modernize its nuclear arsenals and the delivery systems till a perceived
parity is achieved with the two great powers (US and Russia). China
will certainly not agree to cut the number of nuclear arsenals as it
wants both the US and Russia to implement further reductions in their
respective nuclear arsenals.
Interactions with another Chinese academician Dr. Shulong Chu,
Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the School
of Public Policy and Management and the Deputy Director of the
Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies at Tsinghua
University in Beijing, China in a session on China-US Strategic
Stability on 4/6/2009 during the Carnegie International
Non-proliferation Conference, Washington DC revealed very interesting
Chinese perspectives. Chu explicitly stated that since China has
accepted US supremacy, analogously both India and Japan should accept
Chinese supremacy in the Asia-pacific region. China is a bigger country
than Japan and India. It has bigger military requirements. Japan, India
and other Asian countries should understand that and should be willing
to accept China’s ongoing modernization of its military and strategic
(read nuclear) assets. Chu further went on saying: “Russia and the US
have too many nuclear war-heads. They can afford to have deep cuts.
China cannot do that because China has too few. China wants more and its
agenda is to have more nuclear weapons”.
Major-General Yao Yunzhu, Director of the Center on China-America
Defense Relations of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing
in a session on Deterrence, Disarmament and Non-proliferation during the
Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington,
DC on April 8-9th 2013, artfully deflected all the questions on China’s
growing number of nuclear arsenals with a cute smile, stating again that
the onus for nuclear warhead reduction lies on both US and Russia
because China has very limited, small number of nuclear weapons. General
Yao while doing routine lip-service to the NFU doctrine explicitly
admitted that, "A certain amount of opaqueness is an integral part of
China's no-first-use policy". She persistently refused to quantify the
number of warheads China needed for a credible and effective nuclear
deterrence. She officially expressed Chinese Government‘s serious
concern at the US shifting its ballistic missiles interceptors in the
Pacific island of Guam to deal with DPRK nuclear threat, thereby
degrading the quality of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. She enumerated
three essential characteristics for the Chinese nuclear deterrent: it
has to be survivable against first strike; it has to be credible enough
in numbers and in delivery system, and lastly it has to have an
effective and punitive second strike retaliatory capability. She was
asked about recent BMD tests by China on January 22nd 2013 and she
categorically confirmed that China will, from now on, indeed develop its
own BMD system as the US is not willing to commit to cease its BMD
system.
Professor Li Bin from the Department of International Relations,
Tsinghua University, Beijing and also a Senior Associate at Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC admits formally in
his writings that China’s non-proliferation posture has evolved over a
period of time and now is an important and essential part of its nuclear
theology. However, in private discussions he passionately justified
Chinese horizontal proliferation activities outside the scope of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group by providing Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 nuclear
plants to Pakistan on grounds that China had helped India also with
nuclear fuel supplies for the Tarapore Atomic Reactor when India was
under the US nuclear embargo. He assertively implied that China will
continue to provide nuclear materials and technology to its all-weather
friend Pakistan analogous to US-India civil nuclear deal though the
latter deal was approved by the NSG. Interestingly a younger researcher
Zhu Jianyu from the Center for Strategic Studies of the China Academy
of Engineering Physics during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy
Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013 candidly admitted
that Chinese press and academicians usually toe the government line
because the government controls their funding and hence independent
viewpoints are not possible.
In private discussions with Major General Yao, it became quite clear
that China will now vigorously pursue development of its national
ballistic missile defense system; something which China had vociferously
denounced earlier. She also stated that China will continue to develop
its ASAT weapons till a legally binding multi-lateral treaty banning
weaponization of the space is signed and ratified. Major General Yao
attributed to and categorically linked this shift in Chinese strategic
thinking to the recent US decision to deploy 14 long-range ballistic
missile interceptor batteries in the Pacific Island of Guam ostensibly
in response to threats posed by the DPRK thereby potentially degrading
the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Changes in the Chinese nuclear posture
are also linked to the US development and deployment of advanced
precision guided conventional warheads in the Asian theatre capable of
destroying Chinese multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
(MIRV) ballistic missile silos thereby degrading the Chinese minimum
nuclear deterrent. China is focused on modernizing and its strategic
survivability and beefing up its effective second strike capability and
therefore will continue to develop more nuclear warheads and will keep
its nuclear capabilities fully opaque.
China’s 2013 Defence White Paper
For the first time, the 2013 edition of China’s defense white paper
entitled: “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” conspicuously
fails to mention re-adherence to and re-affirmation of China’s
often-stated “No first use pledge”. This is significant departure from
the 2011 version of China’s Defense White Paper. The absolutely
deafening silence in the 2013 version on NFU is deliberate and is very
significant for its reverberating eloquence. The new white paper
introduces ambiguity as it endorses the use of nuclear weapons in
response to a nuclear attack but does not rule out other uses. In the
last few years, Chinese analysts and officials have done an excellent
job of qualifying the original Chinese “NFU” pledge with myriads of
qualitative exceptions so as to render it effectively meaningless. This
carefully contrived departure is strategically significant for the
international community.
Following a vigorous international debate on China’s departure from
the NFU policy, Major General Yao floated a trial balloon in an op-ed
piece in Asia Times Online on April 24
th 2013 when she called
for a legally binding multi-lateral NFU agreement. She wrote a point
by point rejoinder while still defending the reasons as to why China
should depart from the often stated NFU policy and acknowledged that
domestic discussions happening in China regarding junking the NFU
policy. She has tried to invoke new exceptions to China’s so-called NFU
commitment linking it to a new US law (2013 National Defense
Authorization Act) that seeks a report from the Commander of the US
Strategic Command by August 15
th 2013 to describe the Chinese
underground tunnel networks and to review the US capability to
neutralize such networks with conventional and nuclear forces.
Ostensibly, with a view to creating more confusion and more opaqueness
about China’s intentions, she explicitly states: “To alleviate China's
concerns, a constructive approach would be to assure the policy through
nuclear policy dialogues, to establish a multilateral NFU agreement
among all the nuclear weapon states, and to consider limiting or even
prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding
international agreement.” Li Bin, in bilateral context, has previously
suggested that India and China should begin their nuclear engagement
with mutual reassurance of NFU and should work together in advocating
NFU in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.
China very well knows such a legally binding international agreement
will not be negotiated for several decades owing to US dogmatic
postures. The US is already spending $10 billion to upgrade its nuclear
weapons despite Obama’s initial call for a global zero goal. This gives a
window of opportunity for China to increase its nuclear warheads
exponentially while keeping its so-called NFU pledge under suspended
animation and even junk it de facto. Interestingly, China refuses to
enter into an official government to government nuclear weapons dialogue
with India on the grounds that India is non-signatory to the NPT. At
the same time, China has shrewdly refused to engage in bilateral
dialogue with the US on nuclear arms reductions on grounds of asymmetry
of nuclear forces of respective countries. China does complain of
discrimination and nuclear asymmetry while discussing US-China relations
but fails to address genuine Indian concerns on similar grounds.
Implications for India
Western debate on the perceptible change in Chinese nuclear posture
has focussed only on its narrow impact on the strategic environment of
the US and its allies including Japan. India should not behave like an
ostrich burying its head in the sand. Perhaps, time has come for India
to review her own strategic nuclear doctrine revising the no-first use
pledge. Robust evidence has come cumulatively over a period of time from
multiple sources reflecting the new nuclear reality in our
neighborhood. Totality of the evidence available convinces this analyst
that China has indeed changed its nuclear posture from defensive to
offensive and is on a large-scale nuclear build-up. China is indeed
willing to consider first strike capability to preserve its core
national issues though vehemently denying such intentions at the moment.
Predictably, China will continue to obfuscate this change in nuclear
posture using ambiguous, turgid and opaque language while simultaneously
blaming the US for failing to negotiate a legally binding multi-lateral
agreement on NFU. Indeed, this gives the dragon a fig-leaf of
deniability. Certainly, India should not countenance being the only
nuclear weapon state pledging “no first use” while the global nuclear
posturing has become indeed hardened. One has to take into factor
Pakistan’s accelerated development of tactical nuclear weapons and its
stringent refusal to negotiate and sign a multi-lateral Fissile
Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and continued Chinese help to Pakistan
in and outside the NSG. While Pakistan has never subscribed to an NFU
commitment and its nuclear arsenal is specifically India-centric; the
recent change in China’s nuclear posture is definitely of concern to
India. The writing is on the wall as China does not have good track
record of strategic comfort and reliability vis-a-vis India. The current
incidence of Chinese incursion into Indian territory in Daulat Beg
Oldie region in the Ladakh sector should be an eye-opener. While India
must focus on its economic, infrastructure and social development and
must not waste her meager fiscal resources in a costly nuclear race, she
needs to be prepared for all strategic options. Given the aggressive
behavior of China in recent years appropriate and credible policies need
to be adopted including having a re-look at evolving nuclear posture of
China.
http://www.councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/2013/05/no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-with.html
Published Date: 2
nd May 2013
